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SUBSIDIARITY IN PRIVATE LAW? 
 
Forthcoming in (2020) 24(1) Edinburgh Law Review 
 
Mat Campbell* 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
As in law generally,1 clarity, certainty, and predictability are important to private law.2 By extension, 
there is value in an improved understanding of how different private law rules, regimes, and 
institutions interrelate.3 The utility of subsidiarity to the pursuit of this aim has not been explored 
by anglophone private lawyers. To date, the only substantial discussion of subsidiarity in 
anglophone private law scholarship has taken place in the realm of unjust enrichment.4 Even then, 
this material is relatively thin; and outwith that particular context, lawyers are yet to debate more 
broadly about, say, the meaning of subsidiarity in private law.5 By contrast, subsidiarity’s basic 
meaning and function have been extensively analysed in English outside the private law sphere. 
And in France, a small but significant general discourse about subsidiarity from a private law 
perspective does exist. The French literature shows that subsidiarity in private law need not, by 
any means, be confined to the context of unjust enrichment.6 Subsidiarity could one day transcend 
the unjust enrichment setting in anglophone private law discourse, too. 
 
This state of affairs prompts the attempt in this paper to stir debate by offering six propositions 
about what it might mean to designate a rule or relationship (between legal regimes, say) as one of 
subsidiarity.7 The object is pre-emptively to provide some first and – necessarily – non-exhaustive 
general thoughts about subsidiarity, suitable for evaluating its worth to private law, in which it 
might be used to understand legal rules, or the interaction of different kinds of claim. 
 
Given the lack of material on which to build in English, and which is specific to private law, this 
paper casts a wide net for consensus. Its six propositions are formulated by reference, principally, 
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Bobby Lindsay, Hector MacQueen, and two anonymous reviewers. For her encouragement, thanks are also due to 
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1 Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010) ch 3. 
2 See, eg, Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Investment Trust Companies [2017] UKSC 29, [2018] AC 275 paras 38, 41. 
3 Lord Rodger wrote that such things are often overlooked in general, giving examples from private law to support 
his view: A Rodger, “‘Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth’: The Costs and Benefits of Mixed Legal Systems” (2003) 
78 Tul LR 419 at 425. 
4 Publications about this more specific topic based on my doctoral research, “The Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment: 
Anglo-Franco-Scots Perspectives” (PhD Thesis, Edinburgh, 2019), are in preparation. Detailed discussion is avoided 
here. 
5 This is not to say that private lawyers have not thought about subsidiarity at all. See, eg, P Zumbansen, “Happy 
Spells? Constructing and Deconstructing a Private-Law Perspective on Subsidiarity” (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp 
Probs 24, pondering the contribution of private law thinking to subsidiarity elsewhere, namely, in global governance 
and transnational regulation. 
6 The sources are cited ambulando, except for one contribution, which, though notable, and which supports the point 
just made in the main text, is too concrete to be of more general abstract assistance: C David, “Le principe de 
subsidiarité: droits privé et fiscal français et droit communautaire” in A Lévi (ed), Droit et vie des affaires: Études à la 
mémoire d’Alain Sayag (1997) 205. 
7 Whilst these propositions are supported by the sources cited below, space precludes a more detailed account of 
subsidiarity in general, about which divergent views are legitimately held across different fields. On some of these see, 
eg, A Føllesdal, “Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity” (2014) 55 Nomos 214. For a detailed historico-etymological 
study, which cannot be pursued here, see A Joyeux’s monumental “Le principe de subsidiarité, entre terminologie et 
discours: pistes pour une nouvelle histoire de la formule” (PhD Thesis (in two vols), Franche-Comté, 2016). 
to thinking about subsidiarity in other contexts; and, secondarily, to (i) miscellaneous literature 
about subsidiarity, (ii) the general French private law literature about subsidiarity, and (iii) what 
abstract points can be gleaned from relevant unjust enrichment discourse.8 The state of play in 
that discourse is summarised, before the choice of Roman Catholic social teaching, European 
Union law, and European human rights law as settings to examine for their conceptions of 
subsidiarity is explained, and subsidiarity in each of these contexts is sketched out. Succeeding 
sections then outline each proposition, and clarify how it may be derived from the sources. The 
paper concludes by reflecting on the potential of subsidiarity in private law, as a way to model the 
interrelation of private law claims and doctrines. 
 
B. SUBSIDIARITY IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
Sources endorsing the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment commonly agree that it involves the 
conditional constraint of enrichment claims as subsidiary to others.9 Several variations on this 
theme exist.10 These are canvassed to provide clarity during later discussion, before some more 
general observations. 
 
Sometimes, subsidiarity entails that enrichment claims are barred in the presence of another claim or 
legal institution, ie, where another route to redress is available at the same time as an enrichment 
claim.11 This first kind of rule is supported in South Africa, for example, where the eventual 
recognition of a general enrichment action has been embraced, but on the basis that it could only 
be invoked if established enrichment actions (such as the condictiones) would not avail a plaintiff.12 
So, too, in Scotland. In Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council,13 the pursuer performed the defender’s 
obligation to keep up a bridge, and an enrichment claim in respect of the expense saved was barred, 
because a statutory action for the performance of the defender’s statutory duty was available.14 
 
Subsidiarity may also entail that enrichment claims are barred in the absence of another claim or legal 
institution, ie, where another route to redress is itself barred, and an enrichment claim might 
otherwise arise, or where another legal regime expressly or impliedly excludes the operation of 
unjust enrichment. This second kind of rule has been endorsed in Scots law. In Courtney’s Executors 
v Campbell,15 an enrichment claim by a cohabitant’s estate against the deceased’s former partner 
was barred because, at the material time, the one year time limit on a statutory action for financial 
redress following cohabitation breakdown had expired.16 
 
                                                 
8 For reasons of space, and to avoid imputing propositions to authors who may not assent to them, only more 
developed literature is cited, to the exclusion of shorter, intuitive observations, such as W Swain’s brief explanation 
of a case as having held that a “non-contractual action was subsidiary to the action in contract”, though no such 
language appears in the judgment: The Law of Contract 1670-1870 (2015) 136; discussing Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 Term 
Rep 320; 101 ER 573.  
9 Including, potentially, different kinds of enrichment claim: R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment 
Acquired in Any Other Manner (2013) paras 3.09-3.10, 3.37-3.39. 
10 Detailed discussion of relevant law and scholarship in England, France, and Scotland (with some reference to other 
jurisdictions, such as Australia) may be found in Campbell (n 4) chs 3-9. 
11 Whether a claim must be practically or theoretically available, and against whom, are questions which legal systems 
do not always answer: HL MacQueen, Unjustified Enrichment, 3rd edn (2013) 54. 
12 McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA) at 487-489, arguing for “a general action which 
will fill the gaps” between and around South Africa’s established enrichment actions, and noting historical support 
for a general action, “at least one of a subsidiary nature”; D Visser, “The Potential Role of a General Enrichment 
Action” (2009) 20 Stellenbosch LR 454 at 456-458; J du Plessis, The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (2012) 
6-10; J C Sonnekus, Unjustified Enrichment in South African Law, 2nd edn (JE Rhoodie tr, 2017) 50-51. 
13 Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council [2005] CSOH 76, 2005 SLT 958. 
14 Court of Session Act 1988, s 45. 
15 Courtney’s Executors v Campbell [2016] CSOH 136, 2017 SCLR 387. 
16 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 28(8). 
Other legal systems endorse both kinds of rule, as does France,17 in the Code civil’s article 1303-3, 
which provides: “The impoverished person has no action on this basis [ie, in enrichissement injustifié] 
where another action is open to him or is barred by an obstacle of law, such as prescription.” So, 
where a delictual action is available on a given set of facts,18 or where its conditions cannot be 
established (an obstacle of law),19 an action in enrichissement injustifié will be barred on those facts. 
The position is a little more complex, however. French courts do not rigidly apply their version of 
the second kind of rule identified here.20 There is also a third rule of subsidiarity,21 that where an 
action other than one based on enrichissement injustifié is practically useless due to an obstacle of 
fact,22 then an enrichment action will be allowed. The standard example of this is where A’s 
contractual claim against B is useless because of B’s insolvency, which fact will open the way to an 
enrichment action against C, where C has been unjustifiably enriched by A’s contractual 
performance.23 This rule is not confined to cases in which B is contractually obliged to A;24 it can 
also apply in two party cases;25 and obstacles of fact other than insolvency have been recognised 
by the courts.26 
 
To diversity among systems which explicitly endorse the vocabulary of subsidiarity to explain 
unjust enrichment’s interactions with other areas of law must be added different approaches to 
the use of the language by common law scholars. Some have imposed the vocabulary of 
subsidiarity on judicial decisions from which it is absent,27 or where it appears only in a judge’s 
                                                 
17 For general commentary on the institution of quasi-contrat in France, and, specifically, the action in enrichissement 
injustifié, see F Terré and others, with F Chénedé, Droit civil: Les obligations, 12th edn (2018) paras 1261-1330 esp 1299-
1318. 
18 CA Paris, 22 December 2017, RG no 14/19086. 
19 CA Agen, 9 May 2018, RG no 16/00044 (the action failed for want of fault by the defendant). 
20 The rule is seemingly not applied in informal contexts, as where a contract of ad hoc partnership cannot be proved: 
Civ 1re, 4 May 2017, pourvoi no 16-15563, Bull civ I, no 103; [2017] JCP G 790, noted by Y Dagorne-Labbe; [2017] D 
1591, noted by A Gouëzel. The classic counterexample here is the consistent denial of enrichment actions in the 
presence of unproved contracts of loan, to which particular rules of proof apply: Civ 1re, 2 April 2009, pourvoi no 08-
10742, Bull civ I, no 74; [2009] Defrénois 1285, observations by E Savaux; [2009] RTD Civ 321, observations by B 
Fages. On proof of loans, see the Code civil, art 1359; Civ 1re, 19 June 2008, pourvoi no 07-13912, Bull civ I, no 176. 
For ad hoc partnership, provable by any means, see the Code civil, arts 1832, 1873; Com, 13 March 1984, pourvoi no 
82-11866, Bull civ IV, no 99. 
21 The continued existence of which is confirmed by an a contrario reading of the Code civil, art 1303-3: O Deshayes, T 
Genicon and Y-M Laithier, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations – Commentaire article par 
article, 2nd edn (2018) 634. 
22 The terminology dates to at least the 1940s in the French cases. See, eg, CA Orléans, 5 January 1949; [1949] S, II, 
64. There, the court distinguished an “obstacle juridique” from a “simple obstacle de fait” by reference to the “caractère 
subsidiaire” of the action de in rem verso, and its status as a “voie subsidiaire”.  
23 Req, 11 September 1940; [1940] Gaz Pal, II, 114; [1941] S, I, 121, noted by P Esmein. 
24 The relevant obligation may be statutory: Civ 1re, 1 February 1984, pourvoi no 82-15496, Bull civ I, no 45; [1984] D 
388, noted by J Massip; [1984] RTD Civ 712, observations by J Mestre. 
25 As where B cannot be sued in one manner at first, but later returns to a financial position which makes it worthwhile 
for A to sue B in enrichissement injustifié: Civ 1re, 3 May 2007, pourvoi no 05-19454; [2007] RTD Civ 765, observations 
by J Hauser. 
26 CA Nîmes, 13 September 2012, RG no 09/02741: absence from jurisdiction of B, so C, in the jurisdiction, could be 
sued instead; CA Riom, 13 mars 2017, RG no 15/02796: B’s lack of known domicile meant than C could be sued 
instead; Civ 1re, 3 May 2007 (n 25): B”s absence and destitution. 
27 See, eg, R Havelock, “Anticipated Contracts That Do Not Materialise” [2011] RLR 72 at 73 and note 18; R Havelock, 
“A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit” (2016) 132 LQR 470 at 473-474 and notes 33-34; citing, for the view 
that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to the law of contract, Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) 
[1994] 1 WLR 161 (HL) at 164. There, Lord Goff referred to the contractual regime between Trident and Pan Ocean, 
rendering a restitutionary remedy against Creditcorp (Trident’s assignee of a right to hire) “both unnecessary and 
inappropriate”; his Lordship also referred, at 166, to the fact that a claim in restitution would have been “unjust”, 
since Creditcorp had purchased, as assignee, a right to payment from Trident (the assignor). None of this explicitly 
suggests a subsidiarity analysis, but others still have cited the decision as endorsing the subsidiarity of unjust 
enrichment to the law of contract. See, eg, R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event” 
[2003] CLJ 717 at 741-744 and notes 112, 118. Another decision said to support the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment 
footnotes.28 Others, by contrast, have avoided this practice.29 Thus, a cautious survey in 2002 noted 
that unjust enrichment in the common law “does not know ‘subsidiarity’ by that name, but 
elements of that relationship appear to be embedded in the law”.30 Common law judges have not 
yet decided whether subsidiarity is indeed relevant to unjust enrichment, as some commentators 
consider. 
 
The above patchwork cannot be criticised in itself: it is axiomatic that difference is not necessarily 
a bad thing. It does, however, spark interest in the possibility of clarifying our understanding of 
subsidiarity before it migrates to other private law contexts. This paper seeks to identify consensus 
for the future. In this regard, the divergent unjust enrichment sources are of limited use. But 
reference can still be made below to points at which unjust enrichment discourse aligns with 
material from the other contexts under consideration. As well as supporting the propositions put 
forward, this may give an idea of the maturity of anglophone discourse about subsidiarity in unjust 
enrichment, seemingly the only private law arena in which it has been addressed at any length. 
From the unjust enrichment sources, we can also surmise that the potential use of subsidiarity to 
private lawyers in general is in understanding legal rules, and in modelling relations between 
different kinds of claim, doctrine, or legal institution.31 
 
C. SELECTING AND SUMMARISING SUBSIDIARITIES IN THE WORLD 
ELSEWHERE 
 
To avoid repetition below, basic features of subsidiarity in Roman Catholic social doctrine, 
European Union Law, and European human rights law, are outlined here, after three preliminary 
points. First, these contexts are the maximum manageable in the space available, taking account 
of other material cited. Catholic teaching has been selected because, whilst such luminaries as 
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Althusius, are generally regarded as earlier mediators of thought about 
subsidiarity, the Church has long made “deliberate efforts to systematise” it.32 European Union 
law and European human rights law are included because their conceptions of subsidiarity have 
been the subject of much analysis, and, at least for the purposes of this paper, appear well settled.33 
                                                 
to the law of contract, but which does not contain the vocabulary, is Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, [2014] AC 
938; referred to by R Havelock, “The Valuation of Enrichment in the Supreme Court” [2013] RLR 97 at 101 and 
notes 207-212 (footnoting in the case notes section of this journal is continuous). 
28 In the title of an article cited in second place, behind a source which was selected for full quotation in a judgment 
itself: Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68, (2001) 208 CLR 516 para 75 and notes 113-114 
(Gummow J); citing, in order, J Dietrich, Restitution: A New Perspective (1998) 29-35; R Grantham and C Rickett, “On 
the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment” (2001) 117 LQR 273 at 289-293; then quoting from D Laycock, “The Scope 
and Significance of Restitution” (1989) 67 Texas LR 1277 at 1278. Gummow J’s dictum is taken to endorse subsidiarity 
by, eg, R Grantham, “Restitutionary Recovery Ex Æquo Et Bono” [2002] Sing JLS 388 at 397-398. 
29 G Jones (ed), Goff & Jones: The Law of Restitution, 7th edn (2007) para 1-062 and note 78; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and 
S Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 9th edn (2016) para 2-04. 
30 L Smith, “Property, Subsidiarity and Unjust Enrichment” in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified 
enrichment: key issues in comparative perspective (2002) 588 at 623. 
31 See, eg, HL MacQueen, “Unjustified Enrichment, Subsidiarity and Contract” in V Palmer and E Reid (eds), Mixed 
Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 322 at 329: subsidiarity involves “questions of the 
relationship between unjustified enrichment and other parts of the law”. 
32 K Endo, “The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors” (1994) 44 Hokkaido LR 652 
at 632-629, 627 (page numbers inverted in original). See also N Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and 
Aquinas” in M Evans and A Zimmermann (eds), Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (2014) 9; R F Johnson, “The Political 
Uses of Subsidiarity: From Thomas Aquinas to Thomas Courchene” (PhD Thesis, Western Ontario, 2000) chs 2-4. 
33 In this regard, we might distinguish, for example, South Africa’s “principle of constitutional subsidiarity”, which 
holds “that where legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not bypass the legislation 
and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short of the constitutional standard”: 
de Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa [2015] ZACC 35, 2016 (2) SA 1 para 53, and the 
authorities cited. This conception of subsidiarity is not discussed here, because it is still developing: Pretorius v Transport 
Pension Fund [2018] ZACC 10, 2019 (2) SA 37 para 52. 
Secondly, one omission should be explained. The idea of a subsidiary entity in corporate law does 
not assist the present analysis. Taking the current United Kingdom companies legislation as an 
example, we may juxtapose subsidiary and holding companies, and subsidiary and parent 
undertakings.34 But the general meaning of subsidiarity merely implies assistance or supplement. 
It does not carry with it the idea of control of a subsidiary entity by a non-subsidiary one, which 
inheres in the corporate law usage. This usage therefore stands out as a “special” one, according 
to the Oxford English Dictionary.35 As such, it is best overlooked in this discussion, which seeks to 
build from generally accepted notions, rather than exceptions to orthodoxy. This choice perhaps 
derives further support from the fact that the equivalent commercial entity in French law is simply 
called a société contrôlée.36 
 
Thirdly, it is helpful to illustrate from a neutral context a consistent theme in what follows: 
subsidiarity is fundamentally about the allocation of competence or authority among entities, or 
groups of entities, on a conditional basis.37 This appears from the following observation by a majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. Subsidiarity is:38 
 
[T]he proposition that law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level of 
government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus 
most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population diversity […]; 
there is a fine line between laws that legitimately complement each other and those that 
invade another government’s protected legislative sphere. 
 
Several scholars agree that subsidiarity is characterised by the operation of a “rebuttable 
presumption” as to where competence or authority lies.39 Conditionality is borne in mind 
throughout our discussion, as it goes to the essence of subsidiarity.40 
 
(1) Roman Catholic subsidiarity 
 
In Centesimus Annus, John Paul II summarised Roman Catholic subsidiarity as follows:41 
                                                 
34 Companies Act 2006 (UK), ss 1159, 1162. See also, eg, Australa’s Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 46. 
35 “Subsidiarity, n.” <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193007> accessed 20 May 2019; “Subsidiary, Adj. and n.” 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193008> accessed 20 May 2019 esp sense 1. B. 1., and special uses. (The Oxford 
English Dictionary has “moved online” for its third edition, and there is no up to date print copy: “OED Editions” < 
https://public.oed.com/history/oed-editions/> accessed 20 May 2019.) 
36 Code de commerce, arts L-233-3, L-233-4. 
37 It may be simplistic to think of relationships of subsidiarity as involving a straightforward hierarchy among entities. 
Since there is no consensus on the point below surface-level, no commitment is made here. See M Cahill, “Theorizing 
Subsidiarity: Towards an Ontology-Sensitive Approach” (2017) 15 Int J Const L 201. 
38 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town) [2001] SCC 40, [2001] 2 SCR 241 para 3, emphasis 
added. The judgment was given in English. Conditionality appears from the official parallel French translation in the 
form of suitability, or not, to perform a given action (emphasis added): “Ce principe [de subsidiarité] veut que le niveau 
de gouvernement le mieux placé pour adopter et mettre en œuvre des législations soit celui qui est le plus apte à le faire, 
non seulement sur le plan de l’efficacité mais également parce qu’il est le plus proche des citoyens touchés et, par 
conséquent, le plus sensible à leurs besoins, aux particularités locales et à la diversité de la population.” 
39 T Horsley, “Space to Breathe: Subsidiarity, the Court of Justice and EU Free Movement Law” (PhD Thesis, 
Edinburgh, 2011) 12-13, 29, 58; J Contesse, “Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System” (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 123 at 125; A Føllesdal, “Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights 
Courts: Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights – or Neither?” (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp 
Probs 147 at 148-149; J Finnis, “Subsidiarity’s Roots and History: Some Observations” (2016) 61 Am J Juris 133 at 
134 (subsidiarity is “presumptive and defeasible”); N Aroney, “Federalism and Subsidiarity: Principles and Processes 
in the Reform of the Australian Federation” (2016) 44 Fed LR 1 at 4 (word rebuttable not used); M Cahill, “Theorizing 
Subsidiarity: A Rejoinder to Gareth Davies” (2017) 15 Int J Const L 231 at 232. 
40 T Latimer, “Against Subsidiarity” (2018) 26 J Pol Phil 282 at 282-283. 
41 Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus (1991) para 48 (original emphasis). See further M Evans, “The Principle of 
Subsidiarity as a Social and Political Principle in Catholic Social Teaching” (2013) 3 Solidarity 44; P Brennan, 
 
[T]he principle of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of a higher order should not 
interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its 
functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity 
with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good. 
 
This principle concerns the allocation of authority to act to the best level of society, with a 
conditional presumption in favour of smaller associations – the smallest one(s) capable of 
performing a given action.42 An accessible example is the Church’s endorsement of families” 
helping other families, with careful state intervention when “families cannot fulfil their 
responsibilities”.43 One can also instance economic regulation, stimulation and support by the state 
in times of crisis, for the benefit of the economy’s users.44 
 
(2) Subsidiarity in European Union Law 
 
Subsidiarity is also a principle of the European Union’s legal order. So far as relevant, article 5 of 
the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) provides:45 
 
3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. 
 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National 
Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the 
procedure set out in that Protocol. 
 
Here, the default presumption favours competence in the Member States. The Union may act in 
cases of shared competence,46 on condition that this be more effective than action by Member 
States.47 Union action is reviewable on subsidiarity grounds before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”).48 A notable example of a reviewed initiative is legislation at Union 
level, aimed at regulating the market for tobacco products and improving public health by reducing 
tobacco usage, through restrictions on the ingredients of tobacco products and their external 
                                                 
“Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine” in M Evans and A Zimmermann (eds), Global Perspectives on 
Subsidiarity (2014) 29. 
42 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra (1961) paras 52-53. 
43 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd rev edn (US Conference of Catholic Bishops tr, 1997) §§2208-2209.  
44 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 2004) §§351-355. 
45 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202/1. From a large literature, see, eg, P Craig, 
“Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis” (2012) 50 JCMS 72; G A Moens and J Trone, “The Principle of 
Subsidiarity in EU Judicial and Legislative Practice: Panacea or Placebo?” (2015) 41 J Legislation 65. For a situation 
of subsidiarity within the wider context of competence and authority in the EU, see R Schütze, “EU Competences: 
Existence and Exercise” in D Chalmers and A Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (2015) 75. 
46 And not of the EU’s exclusive competence: Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco Investments and Imperial Tobacco 
(Approximation of laws) EU:C:2002:741, [2002] ECR I-11453 para 179. 
47 Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – Förderbank v European Central Bank EU:T:2017:337, [2018] 1 
CMLR 7 para 65. 
48 Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [2016] OJ C202/206 para 
8; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/47 art 263; Case 
C-508/13 Estonia v Parliament and Council EU:C:2015:403 paras 41-55. 
packaging. This initiative was unsuccessfully challenged by tobacco companies on the ground that 
the matter was one for Member States alone.49 
 
(3) Subsidiarity in European human rights law 
 
Strasbourg’s “principle of subsidiarity captures a norm of power distribution between” the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the states party to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR” / “the Convention”).50 The 
ECtHR has held that “[s]ubsidiarity is at the very basis of the Convention, stemming as it does 
from a joint reading of [its] Articles 1 and 19”.51 These provisions, which confirm that both 
contracting parties and the ECtHR are bound by the ECHR framework, respectively state: 
 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 
 
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties 
in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of 
Human Rights […]. It shall function on a permanent basis. 
 
One manifestation of subsidiarity within the ECHR framework is highlighted by the following 
observation of the ECtHR:52 
 
By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the primary responsibility for implementing and 
enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities. The 
machinery of complaint to the Court is thus subsidiary to national systems safeguarding 
human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Article 13 and Article 35 § 1 of the 
Convention. 
 
These provisions state: 
 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
The Court may only deal with [a] matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, 
according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six 
months from the date on which the final decision was taken. 
 
The ECtHR has discussed these provisions many times.53 Whilst the default position is that ECHR 
violations will be dealt with domestically, the ECtHR may examine a complaint on condition that 
                                                 
49 Case C-547/14 Philip Morris Brands v Secretary of State for Health EU:C:2016:325, [2017] QB 327 paras 186, 213-228. 
50 Altan v Turkey App no 13237/17 (ECtHR, 20 March 2018) para 2 of the concurring opinion (joined in by a majority). 
51 Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14 para 61. See also A v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 301, (2009) 49 EHRR 
29 paras 154, 174. See generally F Sudre (ed), Le principe de subsidiarité au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l”homme 
(2014); A Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights” (2015) 15 HRLR 313. For a 
situation of subsidiarity in human rights law as a whole, see G L Neuman, “Subsidiarity” in D Shelton (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013) 360. 
52 De Souza Ribiero v France (2014) 59 EHRR 10 para 77. See N Bamforth, “Articles 13 and 35(1), Subsidiarity, and the 
Effective Protection of European Convention Rights in National Law” (2016) 5 EHRLR 501. 
53 See, eg, McFarlane v Ireland (2011) 52 EHRR 20 paras 107-108, 112; Ananyev v Russia (2012) 55 EHRR 18 paras 93-
99; Chiragov v Armenia (2016) 63 EHRR 9 paras 115-116; Ninos v Greece (French text) App no 28453/10 (ECtHR, 7 June 
2018) paras 33-34. 
there be no effective domestic remedies or where these have been exhausted. For example, the 
ECtHR has proceeded to examine alleged Convention violations in relation to inhumane prison 
conditions, even when legal recourse was in theory available from the contracting state, because 
domestic remedies were not sufficiently available in practice.54 
 
D. FIRST PROPOSITION: ASSUMED EXISTENCE OF ENTITIES 
 
Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to determine whether a given entity to 
which it applies actually exists. This is straightforwardly assumed by a rule of subsidiarity. If, instead 
of simply conferring on a set of entities subsidiary and non-subsidiary statuses, a rule 
“disappeared” one or more of those entities, it would be difficult to argue that the rule was one of 
subsidiarity. To be a rule of subsidiarity, a rule should create, maintain, or put an end to, a 
relationship of subsidiarity between entities. A rule which destroys one or more of the entities the 
interaction of which it is supposed to manage might be thought not to discharge any of these 
functions in relation to that entity. It would also seem to deal with a question of overlap (discussed 
in section F of this paper) in a less then conditional manner, an approach opposed to the essence 
of subsidiarity. Once an entity does not exist, there is no way for it eventually to become 
competent, even if a subsidiarity analysis suggests that it should. These intuitions are borne out in 
the contexts under consideration. 
 
Catholic social doctrine supports our first proposition. Its principle of subsidiarity presumes the 
existence all the while of the individuals, groups, and associations which subsidiarity regulates. One 
concern of the common good is “the overall welfare of society and the development of a variety of 
intermediate groups, applying the principle of subsidiarity”.55 “Subsidiarity is first and foremost a form 
of assistance to the human person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies”:56 
 
It is not, therefore, a question of whether there shall be group persons, or whether they 
are efficient or immediately useful to the state. Rather, the question is how these groups 
stand to one another and to the state.57 
 
Support is also found in subsidiarity in European Union law. Article 5(3) TEU cannot be applied 
so as to dissolve the Union. It would be strange if a provision which said nothing about that could 
undo a treaty and put an end to a legal person – the Union – created “for an unlimited period”,58 
to say nothing of all the Member States. Other material suggests that subsidiarity is not about 
wiping them from the face of the map, either.59 
 
A like impression is gleaned from European Human rights law. The ECtHR “function[s] on a 
permanent basis”.60 And “under the subsidiarity principle it falls first to the national authorities to 
redress any alleged violation of the Convention”.61 It seems implausible for a principle which has 
                                                 
54 Varga v Hungary (2015) 61 EHRR 30 paras 44-65. 
55 Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si” (2015) para 157 (emphasis added). On the common good, see further John XIII, 
Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (1963) paras 53-79; Catechism of the Catholic Church (n 43) §§1905-1912. 
56 Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate (2009) para 57. 
57 R Hittinger, “The Coherence of the Four Basic Principles of Catholic Social Doctrine: An Interpretation” in M 
Archer and P Donati (eds), Pursuing the Common Good: How Solidarity and Subsidiarity Can Work Together (2008) 75 at 109. 
58 TEU arts 47, 53. 
59 See, eg, the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391: “This 
Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and for the principle of subsidiarity, the 
rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States […]”. 
60 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art 19. 
61 Mikhno v Ukraine App no 32514/12 (ECtHR, 1 September 2016) para 116. 
the aim of delegating to contracting states responsibility for protecting Convention rights 
simultaneously to be concerned with deciding upon the existence of those states. Articles 13 and 
35(1) of the Convention, set out above, say nothing about doing that at all. 
 
In his monograph on subsidiarity in private law, Antoine Gouëzel recognises the proposition set 
out in this section.62 It is also borne out by the analysis of Lionel Smith in the unjust enrichment 
context. He defines subsidiarity as either “a relationship between claims” or “a relationship 
between legal dispositions or sets of rules”.63 
 
As an idea, subsidiarity may provide arguments for any number of actions, like preserving the existence 
of some agents,64 or their pre-existing internal power structures.65 It can justify the centralisation 
of power in some scenarios where this is appropriate, or even the creation of new agents with 
authority, for example, to represent local concerns in the face of overcentralisation.66 However, 
these matters are simply expressions of subsidiarity’s more general preoccupation, and what seems 
to be its overriding, master function as an operative rule: to allocate competence or authority on a 
conditional basis.67 It is unconcerned with whether the entities to which authority might be 
allocated exist.  
 
E. SECOND PROPOSITION: PLURALITY OF ENTITIES 
 
A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, or groups of entities. This is 
a relatively short point. Most scholars tacitly assume its correctness,68 though some are explicit 
about it.69 Without a plurality of entities, no relationship – whether a relationship of subsidiarity 
or not – would be possible in a given context, and whatever authority or competence existed in 
that context would lie unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. The Roman Catholic 
Church teaches that:70 
 
Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who is always 
capable of giving something to others. […] It is able to take account both of the manifold 
articulation of plans – and therefore of the plurality of subjects – as well as the coordination of 
those plans. 
 
                                                 
62 A Gouëzel, La subsidiarité en droit privé (Economica 2013) para 319. 
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120-122. 
65 G A Bermann, “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States” 
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66 N W Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity” (2005) 11 Eur LJ 308 at 314, 319-320. 
67 M Jachtenfuchs and N Krisch, “Subsidiarity in Global Governance” (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 1 at 9-10: 
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levels than alternative ways to achieve the same aim. […] [H]owever, as a default rule for the distribution of decision-
making powers, subsidiarity is primarily an allocative principle”. 
68 See, eg, P S Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal 
Pluralism” (2013) 20 Indiana J Global LS 665 at 670, 688-690; T Endicott, “Comity among Authorities” [2015] CLP 
1 at 8-11, 20-21. 
69 T Horsley, “Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?” (2012) 50 
JCMS 267 at 268: “subsidiarity is premised on the existence of at least two autonomous decision-making bodies, 
unified through the pursuit of a common objective”. 
70 Benedict XVI (n 56) para 57 (emphasis added). 
Hittinger says:71 
 
As a principle regulating and coordinating a plurality of group-persons, subsidiarity 
presupposes a plurality of such persons, each having distinct common ends, kinds of 
united action, and modes of authority. […] Take away social plurality and there is nothing 
that can correspond to the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
This seems difficult to disagree with. If the Member States of the European Union did not exist 
as a group, then there would be nothing to which the Union could be subsidiary. If the Union did 
not exist, then even if the Member States were “non-subsidiary” in relation to other things, they 
could not be “non-subsidiary” in relation to the Union. These points also hold true for relations 
between the states party to the ECHR, and the ECtHR. French private law scholars agree: more 
than one entity is required for subsidiarity to be relevant in a given context.72 And in the unjust 
enrichment context, a well-known definition of subsidiarity explicitly states that “[s]ubsidiarity 
describes [a] relationship between two claims or doctrines”.73 
 
F. THIRD PROPOSITION: POTENTIAL FOR OVERLAP 
 
For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that context must be capable of 
overlapping if unrestrained. This goes to the central purpose of subsidiarity. Without some potential 
for overlap in the actions of a plurality of entities, in the sense that the subject(s) of their action is 
(or are) the same, there is nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. Of the “principle of 
subsidiary function”,74 the Catholic Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno states:75 
 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own 
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the 
same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. 
 
Catholic social doctrine therefore assumes that subsidiarity is about resolving overlap in the 
activities of which individuals and associations of different sizes are each capable. Were this not 
true, a principle like that set out in Centesimus Annus, above (in section C(1)), would serve no 
purpose. 
 
In the European Union context, it seems clear as a matter of fact that there are things which both 
Union and Member States are capable of doing. Indeed, their relations are also premised upon 
their both being able, at least to some extent, to “assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties”.76 
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We see the same assumption in European Human rights law. Articles 1 and 19 of the ECHR oblige 
both contracting states and the ECtHR to secure the Convention rights of those over whom the 
latter have jurisdiction. Subsidiarity establishes default competence in the contracting states, and 
the case law of the ECtHR elaborates on when this position shifts. It would not need to do this 
unless both contracting states and the ECtHR could enforce Convention rights. And if that were 
not possible, there would be no need for subsidiarity, “a fundamental feature of the machinery of 
protection established by the Convention”.77 
 
The French writers on subsidiarity in private law agree on this point:78 the potential for overlap 
between norms of concurrent application is the raison d’être of subsidiarity. Philippe Casson usefully 
suggests that, in private law, we might think about overlap in terms of whether sets of norms can 
be invoked on the same set of facts,79 and the same view can be discerned in the work of noted 
enrichment scholar, Hector MacQueen.80 As writers on unjust enrichment also confirm, 
overlapping norms may, at least in theory, amount to claims against the same person, or different 
people.81 
 
G. FOURTH PROPOSITION: META-AUTHORITY 
 
For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it must bind the relevant entities 
by constituting an independent, higher authority in relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant 
entities could manage their relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for 
example, would be the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant 
interactions), there would be no need for subsidiarity. This may be called the “subsidiarity as meta-
authority” point.82 By this, it is meant that a rule of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities 
to which it applies have competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained.83 
And the condition, howsoever formulated, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. These points are borne out in the contexts under examination. 
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Roman Catholic social doctrine sees subsidiarity as a “universal authority”, which, in the eyes of 
its framer, the Church, governs conditions within states, and across the world between states.84 
More generally, Catholic social doctrine, of which subsidiarity is part, emanates from the Church. 
The latter considers itself independent of society, especially the state, and capable of intervening 
authoritatively in social affairs, in particular those of the state.85 So the Church is a meta-authority 
in relation to the individuals and social associations, the interaction of which it seeks to manage 
with its meta-rule of subsidiarity. 
 
In the European Union, member states and the Union are bound by the treaties and European 
Union law in general.86 In particular, the principle of subsidiarity binds the Union.87 European 
Union subsidiarity thus sits higher than, and separately from, the entities the interaction of which 
it manages. 
 
Under the ECHR, the relevant function of contracting states and the ECtHR – securing 
convention rights – is not framed as optional in nature by articles 1 and 19 of the Convention. A 
constant line of cases affirms both the subsidiarity of the ECtHR to the member states in fulfilling 
their central objective, and how important this arrangement is.88 The principle also features in a 
Protocol no 15 amending the Convention, which is not yet in force.89 Once it is fully ratified, 
subsidiarity will be present in the Convention as a matter of language, not just interpretation. Even 
now, however, subsidiarity seems secure in practice. It is unlikely that either a disgruntled 
contracting state, or the ECtHR, could reverse their respective positions in the relationship of 
subsidiarity without amending the Convention. Rather, it would probably require a fully negotiated 
protocol or other Convention amendment. After all, this is what was thought necessary for 
Protocol 15, which was addressed at several conferences, and requires unanimous assent.90 
 
To date, the argument in this section seems not to have been made explicitly. Some do, however, 
appear to recognise that, when operating as a rule or principle of allocation, as opposed to a simple 
political or philosophical idea,91 subsidiarity needs to bind the entities to which it applies. This is 
clear, for example, when writers ask questions like: “[w]hat does subsidiarity require?”92 The 
French subsidiarity scholarship is inexplicit on this point. But it is possible to draw on work about 
the interaction in France of the droit commun with the droit spécial (or droits spéciaux), ie, general law 
and special legal regimes. Anglophone lawyers will be familiar with this dichotomy through the 
Latin maxim specialia generalibus derogant.93 Some authors affirm that the droit commun is subsidiary to 
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93 On which, see H Roland and L Boyer, Adages du droit français, 4th edn (1999) §418. The maxim obviously conceals 
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the droits spéciaux.94 But this is only possible because that state of affairs is caused, and relations 
between the two categories of laws are regulated, by something.95 If, as is claimed, that something 
creates a relationship of subsidiarity between the droit commun and droits spéciaux, then it must 
possess authority in relation to the categories the interaction of which it controls,96 and so be 
independent of them. There could be no relationship of subsidiarity if this something were just an 
element of one of the categories in the relationship. That would just make for a relationship 
involving the sovereignty of one entity (or entities), and the subjection of another (or others), 
depending on one’s point of view. A group of entities capable of organising their own relations in 
this way does not need subsidiarity. In French law, there seems to exist an independent norm, 
potentially sans texte, according to which the droit commun applies in default of the droits spéciaux.97 
The norm also features in some legislation. One can instance article 1105 (formerly article 1107) 
of the Code civil,98 which assures the default application of general rules of contract law.99 Its 
independence from the general and special rules is clear by its placement in the first chapter of the 
relevant title of the relevant book of the Code civil, headed “Preliminary provisions” (dispositions 
liminaires). The maxim specialia generalibus derogant in French law, which can be conceived in terms 
of subsidiarity, is a meta-authority in relation to the general and special rules to which it applies. 
 
For those discussing the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment, and thinking about the expansion of 
subsidiarity into other realms of private law, there is much food for thought here. In academic 
writing, it is not always clear what is thought to be the source of the subsidiarity of unjust 
enrichment.100 Those who have considered the point have suggested that subsidiarity is a 
characteristic inherent in unjust enrichment.101 But it has also been argued that, at least when it 
comes to enrichment-contract relations, the primacy of contract is what assures enrichment’s 
subsidiarity instead.102 On either of these views, and if there is any merit in the idea of subsidiarity 
as meta-authority, subsidiarity might not be needed by unjust enrichment lawyers. Why introduce 
a tertium quid to complicate matters if, say, unjust enrichment and contract can manage their 
interrelationship without it? This idea will also be relevant when private lawyers consider what 
subsidiarity can contribute outside the unjust enrichment context. 
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H. FIFTH PROPOSITION: NOT SOVEREIGNTY 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship can be sovereign over any 
other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, 
because authority in that context would be allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence 
of subsidiarity. As outlined at the start of section C of this paper, subsidiarity is a conditional idea. 
If understood as absolute, sovereignty is antithetical to subsidiarity.103 If, for example, a doctrine 
of constitutional law renders federal undertakings immune from the legislative acts of provincial 
powers, then on the facts, the sovereign federation and subordinate provinces are not in a 
relationship of subsidiarity.104 
 
The Catholic Church teaches that the violation of the principle of subsidiarity is a “disturbance of 
right order”.105 Subsidiarity has been called a “most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside 
or changed, [and] remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy”, pronounced under the 
Church’s “supreme authority upon social and economic matters”.106 Taking Catholic teaching on 
its own terms, there is no room for the sovereignty of any entity to which subsidiarity applies, 
from the multinational corporation to the private individual. 
 
So, too, in European Union law. The letter of article 5(3) TEU and the relevant case law are 
explicit. Subsidiarity only applies in areas outwith the “exclusive competence” of the Union,107 ie, 
when it is not sovereign over the Member States. A subsidiarity principle to regulate competences 
which the Union can either exercise or delegate to the Member States would be pointless.108 And 
the binding nature of the subsidiarity principle, demonstrated in the immediately preceding section 
of this paper, would be irreconcilable with the Union’s exclusive competence (ie, its capacity to 
decide whether to act).  
 
Moreover, in European Human Rights law, it seems that neither the contracting states nor the 
ECtHR are exclusively competent to secure the protection of convention rights. From the sources 
discussed in section C(3), this appears to be one of the bases upon which the Convention itself 
sits. 
 
The French writers on subsidiarity in private law appear not to have addressed this point. But in 
other areas, many scholars believe that it is correct.109 So, it has been said that “subsidiarity is an 
                                                 
103 It is not, of course, argued that state sovereignty works in absolute terms. It does not: N MacCormick, “On 
Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty” in idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth 
(1999). And it might never have done so: L Bretherton, “Sovereignty” in N Adams, G Pattison and G Ward (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought (2013). 
104 Canadian Western Bank v Alberta (Province) [2007] SCC 22, [2007] 2 SCR 3 para 45: “[t]he asymmetrical effect of 
interjurisdictional immunity can also be seen as undermining the principles of subsidiarity”. 
105 Pius XI (n 74) para 80. 
106 ibid, paras 41, 79. 
107 British American Tobacco (n 46) para 179; Case T-420/05 Vischim v Commission EU:T:2009:391, [2009] ECR II-3841 
para 223. 
108 TFEU art 2(1): “When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered 
by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.” 
109 P D Marquardt, “Subsidiary and Sovereignty in the European Union” (1994) 18 Fordham Intl LJ 616 at 635; N 
MacCormick, “Democracy and Subsidiarity in the European Commonwealth” in idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, 
State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (1999) 137 at 142; P Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law” (2003) 97 Am J Intnl Law 38 at 58, 62-63, 66; I Roele, “Sidelining Subsidiarity: 
United Nations Security Council “Legislation” and Its Infra-Law” (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 189 at 190-
199; P Carozza, “The Problematic Applicability of Subsidiarity to International Law and Institutions” (2016) 61 Am 
J Juris 51 at 60-63 esp 62. 
alternative to sovereignty”;110 and that “[a]s pure concepts, sovereignty and subsidiarity are 
irreconcilable”.111 Since this “not sovereignty” point is essentially the obverse of the “subsidiarity 
as meta-authority” point, the food for thought for private lawyers, mentioned under the previous 
heading, need not be repeated here. 
 
I. SIXTH PROPOSITION: NOT CONCURRENCE 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the entities said to be part of that 
relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a situation, since the competence of any entities 
would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence 
which is happening, or might happen. It is unsurprising to find this borne out in each context 
under consideration. 
 
As we have seen, Roman Catholic subsidiarity is premised on there being an ideal, or best, level of 
society at which a given function may be discharged.112 Article 5(3) TEU is clearly framed on the 
assumption that the overlaps in initiatives by the European Union and Member States, which 
would ensue in subsidiarity’s absence, need to be regulated. The articulation of articles 13 and 35(1) 
ECHR is perhaps the clearest example on the point. The order in which contracting states and the 
ECtHR may hear alleged Convention violations is explicitly regulated by those provisions, as 
interpreted by the ECtHR. But it should be remembered that this is only the default position. It 
seems not antithetical to subsidiarity for there to be overlap – perhaps in the form of co-operation 
– in the exercise of competence by entities, once it has been decided that a subsidiary entity is allowed to 
act. Support for this derives from one of the definitions of the Latin subsidium, a “body of troops 
with held [sic] from action as a reinforcement for the front line or [similarly], the reserves”.113 It is 
reasonable to suppose that it would have been thought better for an officer – let us assume a  
general114 – with overall command of front line troops and reservists to deploy the latter before 
the former are all dead. 
 
Many scholars, including French private lawyers writing on subsidiarity, are explicit about the point 
made in this section.115 Other scholars also assume its correctness.116 Anglophone private lawyers 
may be reassured that unjust enrichment discourse already accepts the idea, too. So, the subsidiarity 
of unjust enrichment has been put forward because “unjust enrichment threatens to create all types 
                                                 
110 Cahill, “Attraction to Subsidiarity” (n 64) at 123. 
111 Cahill, “Theorizing Subsidiarity” (n 37) at 216. 
112 See also Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (n 44) §§185-188. 
113 P G W Glare (ed), The Oxford Latin Dictionary, 2nd edn (2012) 2038-2039. See also DP Simpson, Cassell’s Latin 
Dictionary, 5th edn ([1968] repr 1984) 578.  
114 See A K Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War: 100 BC – AD 200 (1996) 161; J Thorne, “Battle, Tactics, and the 
Emergence of the Limites in the West” in P Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army (2007) 218 at 224; P Rance, 
“Battle” in P Sabin, H van Wees and M Whitby (eds), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, II: Rome from 
the Late Republic to the Late Empire (2007) 364-365. 
115 Raynard (n 72) at 134; Casson (n 72) at 152; Gouëzel (n 62) paras 46-47; Habre (n 72) para 20; Fucini (n 72) paras 
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the United States Constitution” (2007) 52 Vill LR 67 at 72-74; J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd edn (2011) 
145-147; A von Staden, “The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and 
Judicial Standards of Review” (2012) 10 Int J Const L 1023 at 1034-1038, 1048-1049; L D Weinberger, “The 
Relationship Between Sphere Sovereignty and Subsidiarity” in M Evans and A Zimmermann (eds), Global Perspectives 
on Subsidiarity (2014) 49 at 59-60; S G Calabresi and L D Bickford, “Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from 
US Constitutional Law” (2014) 55 Nomos 123 at 148-158. Some political scientists have made the point explicitly, 
too. See, eg, D Golemboski, “Federalism and the Catholic Principle of Subsidiarity” (2015) 45 Publius 526, 538, 540-
541: subsidiarity and federalism both “prescribe cooperation, not competition between state-level and national-level 
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of overlaps with, and even takeovers of, areas which belong to other core doctrines of the private 
common law”;117 or that it can be understood as requiring that unjust enrichment “yield to the 
positive dispositions and also to the negative implications of […] other legal institutions”.118 In the 
private law context, then, the proposition under discussion means, for example, that if two claims 
can be invoked in any order and for any reason, they are not in a relationship of subsidiarity. 
 
J. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Anglophone private lawyers are yet to reflect seriously on the usefulness – or uselessness – of 
subsidiarity to explain, outwith the unjust enrichment context, relations between different kinds 
of claim or legal institution. This paper examines conceptions of subsidiarity in spheres other than 
private law. It also links six propositions derived therefrom to relevant literature, including French 
literature about subsidiarity in private law in general, and to what abstract thinking can be distilled 
from unjust enrichment discourse. Though they are not all stated clearly, some awareness of the 
propositions put forward is evident in that discourse. But its thinness relative to developments 
elsewhere, and a lack of consensus on the very source of unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity 
(discussed in section G, in fine), suggest that private lawyers’ understanding of subsidiarity in the 
abstract is germinal. Further debate is needed in order effectively to assess the potential for 
subsidiarity to assist in understanding the interrelation of different institutions of private law. It is 
hoped that the six propositions suggested in this paper will serve as a conceptual starting point in 
this regard. With them in mind, this paper closes with some reflections on the potential of 
subsidiarity in private law. 
 
It is suggested in section D that an operative rule or principle of subsidiarity is not concerned to determine 
whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. Subsidiarity therefore represents a relatively benign 
way to model the interrelation of private law claims, doctrines, and institutions. Subsidiarity’s 
apparent independence from those claims, etc (discussed in section G), also means that it should 
not affect their substantive content. Nor does the mere use of a subsidiarity analysis dictate the 
precise condition on which a subsidiary entity will be allowed to function: we saw above, for 
example, the differing conditions on which the EU or the ECtHR can act in place of Member 
States or domestic courts (effectiveness and absence of domestic recourse, respectively). Similarly, 
then, the condition on which a subsidiary private law claim or doctrine can operate may also be 
framed according to considerations relevant to the precise context in which a given subsidiarity 
rule is applied. These considerations include the content of the regimes it acts upon.119 It thus 
appears that the principal potential contribution of subsidiarity to private law analysis is clarity 
about how claims and doctrines relate to each other. 
 
In section E, it is proposed that a relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two 
entities, or groups of entities. It may be noted that subsidiarity can provide clarity about the relationship 
between multiple private law claims doctrines, not just pairs of them. As discussion about 
subsidiarity by private lawyers becomes more sophisticated, more complex subsidiarity analyses 
may meet with approval. 
 
                                                 
117 Grantham and Rickett, “Subsidiarity” (n 28) at 299. See also Havelock, “Taxonomic Approach” (n 27) at 475-476. 
118 Smith (n 30) at 613. See also MacQueen (n 31) at 350-351. 
119 In a different context, Burbidge (n 82) argues that the social groups whose decision making authority is governed 
by a subsidiarity principle should be able to contribute to the framing of that principle. In private law analysis, this 
might equate to framing the condition on which subsidiary and non-subsidiary doctrines operate by reference to their 
content, or remedial effects. 
Where more than one claim or doctrine is potentially relevant on a given set of facts,120 then, as 
suggested in section F (addressing overlap), subsidiarity might be relevant if private lawyers wish 
to prevent or systematise the invocation of those claims or doctrines by litigants. As seen in section 
G (addressing meta-authority), subsidiarity can facilitate this via an authoritative, conditional 
ordering among claims or doctrines. Two results of “subsidiarity as meta-authority” are the 
propositions addressed in sections H and I. Private law claims or doctrines in a relationship of 
subsidiarity cannot themselves dictate the application of others in that relationship, or simply apply 
at random (not sovereignty and not concurrence). 
 
These abstract observations seem unobjectionable in principle. However, brief further reflection 
discloses two (non-exhaustive) potential complications with the use of subsidiarity to understand 
private law. Both concern what subsidiarity would require of private law in order to function within 
it. 
 
From this perspective, among the elements of subsidiarity outlined in this paper, meta-authority is 
the most problematic. For subsidiarity to model the interaction of legal rules and doctrines in 
practice, it would be necessary prospectively to recognise the possibility of, and then progressively 
develop, many organising meta-rules, capable of mediating relations between rules and doctrines. 
Elsewhere, there are perhaps too many levels of norms to contend with.121 But in the private law 
context, to expect the recognition of even one level of organising rules – specially made to sit above 
existing institutions (like contracts and torts) or doctrines, and so on, and control their interaction 
– may be unrealistic. It is hard to conceive of strong general support;122 and the judges would likely 
be unwilling to make any such moves.123 
 
A second difficulty is that insufficient certainty beneath the surface of private law doctrine may 
hinder subsidiarity’s operation. In and around declared legal rules and their formal sources (such 
as common law and statute) lie normative commitments, consciously made or not; debated or not. 
It is suggested that such underpinnings may need to be spelt out in some detail, and with a degree 
of consistency, for subsidiarity reliably to assist in understanding the interrelation of different 
claims, rules, or doctrines. Lawyers would need to refer to them to decide what should be 
subsidiary, and to what, and perhaps to frame the condition on which a given regime, or type of 
regime, should operate instead of another. Leaving aside the obvious potential for debate about 
what the law says, or should say, and why,124 the rationale of legislation concerning private law 
concepts is sometimes unclear;125 and whilst the judiciary may pronounce on the functions and 
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reasons of private law, there is seldom much depth or uniformity in relevant observations.126 The 
judges cannot, of course,127 be criticised for this.128 They may pursue coherence,129 and consider 
the policies behind legal rules.130 But they still normally decide only the disputes before them.131 
They cannot be great systematisers or justifiers: most often, they develop their law incrementally.132 
Without more clarity from authoritative sources on the law’s foundations, though, subsidiarity 
might only assist with basic instances of interaction. Even then, it might not improve on usual 
methods of understanding legal interrelation. These can often adequately resolve overlaps,133 if, 
indeed, they are considered problematic in the first place.134 
 
This paper has considered one concept which could be employed to improve our understanding 
how different parts of private law relate to each other. In principle, subsidiarity could be useful in 
this endeavour, and neither difficulty just identified militates unanswerably against its use in legal 
scholarship. However, to the question whether subsidiarity might actually find acceptance in private 
law, the response may be: perhaps not. 
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